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chose to rely upon this propounded theory of "negligence in the air" with
the novel result that it has now created a "reverse interpleader." Thus,
a plaintiff who is injured joins all parties who are possibly responsible.
Then, after he frees himself from fault and removes the possibility of
unavoidable accident, the parties must battle among themselves as to
who is not liable. This writer feels that this procedural "plaintiff's
holiday" is repugnant to the entire concept of directed verdict and may,
in turn, effect a change in the substantive law of negligence heretofore
unrecognized in our system of jurisprudence.
THEODORE KLEIN
LANDLORD AND TENANT-TENANT'S LIABILITY FOR
INCREASED RENT DEMANDED AS A CONDITION
OF HOLDING OVER
The plaintiff sold a 320-acre tract to the defendant, taking back a
purchase money mortgage. The plaintiff continued to dwell on the pro-
perty without objection by the defendant. Subsequently, the parties exe-
cuted a written lease for a fixed term at a rental of one dollar. The
plaintiff held over when the lease expired, and the defendant served
written notice that if the plaintiff did not vacate at once, he would be
charged rent at the rate of 300 dollars per month for as long as he con-
tinued to occupy the premises. The plaintiff remained silent as to the
notice and one year later, notice was again served on him quoting the
same terms. When the defendant defaulted on a mortgage installment,
the plaintiff sued to foreclose. The defendant counterclaimed for rent at
the rate of 300 dollars per month, electing to treat the plaintiff as a tenant
rather than as a trespasser and choosing not to hold the plaintiff under
Florida's double rent statute.' The trial court dismissed the counterclaim
on the grounds that the rented premises were not worth 300 dollars
per month. On appeal, held, reversed: when a landlord demands of the
tenant different rent for continued possession of property after the ex-
piration of a lease, and the tenant thereafter continues in possession
without protest, he impliedly agrees to pay the rent demanded. David
Properties, Inc. v. Selk, 151 So.2d 334 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).2
tion of negligence was ultimately left for the jury to decide. However, the Sheehan court
did not avail itself of this theory. Even had it done so, it does not appear that the situa-
tion in the instant case would have been materially altered. The court admitted the fact of
the legal sufficiency of the evidence as to either defendant which would have justified sub-
mission of the question of negligence to the jury.
1. FLA. STAT. § 83.06 (1961). This section provides that "when any tenant shall refuse
to give up possession of the premises at the end of his lease, the landlord or his agent,
attorney or legal representatives, may demand of such tenant double the monthly rent,
and may recover the same at the expiration of every month, or in the manner pointed out
hereinafter."
2. In the lower court the chancellor pointed out that the building was no more than
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It has long been settled that when a tenant holds over at the expira-
tion of his lease the landlord may elect to treat him as a wrongdoer or as
a tenant for a new term.' This right of election in the landlord is exclu-
sive to him, the tenant having no choice in the matter, 4 and the option
to treat the tenant holding over as a tenant for a new term is said to rest
on the theory that one should not be able to refute the existence of a
landlord-tenant relationship by asserting that he is a wrongdoer.5 The
tenant's liability is quasi-contractual,6 and in the absence of an agree-
ment to the contrary the law will imply a continuance of the tenancy on
the same terms as those contained in the expired lease.7
NOTICE OF NEW TERMS
The Apathetic Tenant
The law is considerably less settled, however, when prior to the
expiration of the lease, the landlord notifies his tenant that upon holding
over beyond the term of the lease, the latter will be held to a lease subject
a shack, having no rental value. In the district court of appeal, the tenant argued that
since the chancellor found that the property had no rental value, the landlord was entitled
to no damages. The tenant further argued that because the landlord did not demand double
rent under the statute, he was again entitled to no damages.
Both of these contentions were rejected by the court above. Citing 32 A.L.R.2d 582,
584 (1953), the court pointed out:
There is a difference, although it is not always clearly recognized, between an
action for rent accrued' during a period of holdover and for damages for de-
priving another of the use of property to which he is entitled during such
period ...
One situation which generally involves an action for rent as distinguished from
an action for damages is that in which the lessor notifies the lessee that upon
holding over beyond the expiration of the lease period, the latter will be charged
a higher rental. The action in such case is usually upon the implied contract.
David Properties, Inc. v. Selk, 151 So.2d 334, 339-40 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
3. City of Pittsburgh v. Charles Zubik & Sons, 404 Pa. 219, 171 A.2d 776 (1961); 1
RAsCH, LANDLORD AND TENANT AND SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS § 134 (1950); 3 THOMPSON,
REAL PROPERTY § 1024 (1959) ; 2 TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND TENANT § 209a (1912).
4. See 1 RASCH, op. cit. supra note 3, § 134. See also 3 ThOMPSON, op. cit. supra note
3, § 1024; 2 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 3, § 209a.
5. E.g., 2 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 3, § 209b.
6. That liability in such cases is founded upon an agreement which arises by implica-
tion of law rather than upon actual assent is evident from the fact that the tenant may
be held liable notwithstanding any statements he may make evincing a contrary intention.
Ibid.
7. This principle seems to carry almost universal acceptance in the American jurisdic-
tions. See, e.g., Wingert v. Prince, 123 So.2d 277 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1960).
The general principle holds true even though the tenant informs his landlord that he
does not wish to renew their lease, since his intent to renew must be inferred from the act
of holding over. It is thus the tenant's actions rather than his intent which give the land-
lord the right to treat him as a tenant for a renewed term. Cramer v. Baugher, 130 Md.
212, 100 Atl. 507 (1917) ; Tonkel v. Riteman, 163 Miss. 216, 141 So. 344 (1932) ; Williams
v. King, 247 N.C. 581, 101 S.E.2d 308 (1958).
Rasch notes the importance of denoting the new tenancy as a renewal of the old
term: "The holdover tenancy created at the election of the landlord is not an extension
or prolongation of the original term. It is a new term for the new period, separate and
distinct from that which preceded it." 1 RAscH, op. cit. supra note 3, § 165.
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to new terms. The contract creating the new tenancy, if not expressly
assented to, would then seem to be implied in fact,8 the implication
arising from the act of holding over after the tenant is notified that to do
so will signify his assent to the new terms proposed.' It is thus generally
held that if a landlord notifies his tenant for a fixed term'0 that the
rent will increase if the tenant holds over, the tenant is liable for the
increased rental if he in fact holds over, and either remains silent with
respect to the notice or fails to dissent from the terms thereof."
Since the liability of the tenant is governed by principles of contract
law, we may now examine the question of what constitutes assent by
the tenant to the new terms proposed. When the tenant expresses no
dissent to the new terms but rather continues in silence to occupy the
premises, the courts have spoken almost unanimously in holding that
the act of holding over, in itself, raises the implication that the tenant
has assented to the new terms,12 although many of the decisions speak
in terms of quasi-contract. 3 However, an occasional decision refuses to
grant recovery on the contract in the absence of express assent. 4 As if to
8. See Buesch v. McCullough, 245 Ill. App. 68 (1927); Hunt v. Bailey, 39 Mo. 257
(1866). The relations between the parties or other circumstances may have been such as to
have justified the offeror's expectation of a reply and his assumption that silence indicated
assent to his proposal. WILLISTON & THOMPSON, CONTRACTS § 90 (1938).
9. See, e.g., Higgins v. Halligan, 46 Ill. 173 (1867); Giordano v. Loperfide, 203 App.
Div. 164, 196 N.Y. Supp. 472 (1922).
10. This note will deal only with a tenancy which by agreement will expire at some
predetermined date in the future. It is beyond the scope of the note to discuss the effects
of the landlord's notice of increased rent on one holding under a periodic tenancy or a
tenancy at will, since such tenancies must be terminated by a seasonable notice.
11. 32 Am. JuR. Landlord and Tenant § 950 (1938); Annot., 109 A.L.R. 197 (1937).
See also, e.g., Sherriff v. Kromer, 232 Ill. App. 589 (1924); Heckman v. Walker, 167 Neb.
216, 92 N.W.2d 548 (1958); Best Realty Corp. v. Luftig, 234 N.Y.S.2d 462 (New York
City Civ. Ct. 1962).
12. Higgins v. Halligan, 46 Ill. 173 (1867); Hunt v. Bailey, 39 Mo. 257 (1866);
Heckman v. Walker, 167 Neb. 216, 92 N.W.2d 548 (1958); Giordano v. Loperfide, 203
App. Div. 164, 196 N.Y. Supp. 472 (1922); Machson v. Katz, 187 N.Y. Supp. 411 (New
York City Munic. Ct. 1921); Walnut Hills Inv. Corp. v. Goodman, 109 Ohio App. 106, 163
N.E.2d 801 (1958); Glascock v. Marmon, 4 Tenn. Civ. App. 140 (1914); Amsden v.
Floyd, 60 Vt. 386, 15 Atl. 332 (1888).
Higgins v. Halligan, supra, one of the very first cases to hand down the doctrine,
found no trouble in formulating the rule in the absence of ostensible precedent, when it
said:
The inference is irresistible, that he was content to hold at the increased rent,
and his assent thereto will be implied. The presumption, that he held, after this
notice, on the terms of the original lease, is fully rebutted by his own act and
conduct. Higgins v. Halligan, 46 Ill. 173, 179 (1867).
13. The courts seem to say that the tenant's silence is in law, a virtual assent to the
terms prescribed in the notice. Despard v. Walbridge, 15 N.Y. 374, 376 (1857). For various
expressions of the same rationale see the following: Reithman v. Brandenberg, 7 Colo. 480,
4 Pac. 788 (1884); Fordham Hill Associates v. Fiebach, 21 Misc. 2d 277, 193 N.Y.S.2d
677 (App. Div. 1959); Kaufman v. Bartels, 182 Misc. 128, 50 N.Y.S.2d 568 (App. Div.
.1944); V.G.C. Realty Corp. v. Rosa, 193 N.Y.S.2d 678 (Munic. Ct. 1959); Beck Inv. Co.
v. Ganser, 259 Wis. 69, 47 N.W.2d 490 (1951).
14. The tenant who remains silent and fails to express assent to the new terms is not
made liable for the increased rent merely by his act of holding over. He must accept or
reject the offer. Lautmann v. Miller, 158 Ind. 382, 63 N.E. 761 (1902).
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strengthen their decisions with an embellishment of public policy, some
courts, although holding the tenant liable on the implied contract, de-
clare that to allow the tenant to substitute different terms merely by
remaining in possession is to deprive the landlord of the control of his
own property.'5
The Tenant Who Objects-and Says So
It is this very conflict between adherence to settled principles of
contract law and the right of the property owner to control the terms
under which another may occupy his property that has split the American
courts in cases where the tenant expresses dissent to the new terms pro-
posed, but nevertheless holds over beyond the expiration of the lease.
A number of decisions say that a tenant who holds over after notice of
the new terms becomes absolutely liable notwithstanding his protests.'
Some adopt the theory that the landlord is master over his property,
17
while others consider the act of holding over to be a powerful enough
manifestation of assent to outweigh the tenant's most vehement protesta-
15. Sherriff v. Kromer, 232 Ill. App. 589 (1924). The dicta of a few decisions go
even farther, stating that it is the duty of the tenant to vacate if he does not wish to
accede to the landlord's demand. Hunt v. Bailey, 39 Mo. 257 (1866) ; Glascock v. Marmon,
4 Tenn. Civ. App. 140 (1914).
16. The New York decisions have been based erroneously upon Despard v. Walbridge,
15 N.Y. 374 (1857), a case in which the tenant's assent to the new terms was held to be
manifested by his silence. Moreover, there was no consideration, even in dictum, of what
the court might hold had the tenant objected to the new terms. Yet, one hundred years
later, the New York courts hold the tenant liable over his protests on the basis of Despard
v. Walbridge, supra. 4145 Corp. v. Brown, 189 N.Y.S.2d 500 (App. Div. 1959); Harrison
v. Berkowitz, 202 Misc. 799, 109 N.Y.S.2d 722 (New York City Munic. Ct. 1951).
17. It has been said that a tenant cannot hold the premises after notice from the
landlord and thereby fix his own terms of occupation. Sherriff v. Kromer, 232 Ill. App.
589 (1924); Scully v. Roche, 76 Misc. 458, 135 N.Y. Supp. 633 (App. Div. 1912).
In Griffin v. Knisely, 75 Ill. 411 (1874), the tenant protested the landlord's proposal
before notice was sent, but failed to protest after he received the notice. Thus, the question
of the liability of the tenant who protests a notice of increased rent was never decided.
But in a dictum which has apparently affected subsequent decisions, the court explained
that the tenant,
Concedes that, if he had held over, after notice of the terms, without objection,
he might be held responsible upon the contract. But what difference can his ob-
jection make? The property belonged to appellee, and he surely might charge
for its use what he pleased. If appellant was not willing to accede to his terms,
he should have left the property. He had no right to remain in possession
against appellee's wishes, and force him to accept himself as a tenant, on the
same terms that he held the property the preceding year. Griffin v. Knisely, 75
I1. 411, 417 (1874).
Galloway v. Kerby, 9 Ill. App. 501 (1881) held that a tenant was not liable when
he protested the increased rent after receipt of notice, and distinguished Griffin v. Knisely,
supra, on its facts. But a later decision, Wilson v. Rodman, 243 Ill. App. 570 (1927),
apparently ignored the Galloway decision and instead allowed recovery, citing Griffin v.
Knisely as precedent.
It is generally held that the tenant who waits until the lease has expired before he
first expresses an objection is in no better position than the tenant who remains silent
throughout. Chun Yin Kok v. Woo See Wo, 30 Hawaii 29 (1929); Russells Factory
Stores v. Fielden Furniture Co., 232 S.W.2d 592 (Tenn. App. 1950).
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tions.18 With the assistance of a remarkable piece of circular reasoning,
one court has held the tenant liable in such situations by making use of
the doubtful "presumption" that a tenant holds over on the landlord's
terms rather than as a wrongdoer.' 9
The majority of jurisdictions, however, have denied liability when
the tenant objects to the new terms proposed, notwithstanding his con-
tinued occupation.20 It has been said that to allow the landlord to recover
the rent demanded in such situations is not only unjust but also illogical;
rent is the result of contract, and although a contract may be implied,
no implication could arise where the party sought to be bound had
dissented. 2 ' It is evident from the decisions that the concern of the
courts is more with logic than with justice, since numerous cases denying
liability declare in dicta that had the tenant remained silent his assent
might be implied.22 The courts have never pinpointed the elements that
will amount to dissent sufficient to relieve the tenant of liability. They are
apparently content that a refusal to pay the rent demanded,28 a rejection
of a new lease offered by the landlord,24 or a tender by the tenant of a
18. Stees v. Bergmeier, 91 Minn. 513, 98 N.W. 648 (1904) ; Harrison v. Berkowitz,
202 Misc. 799, 109 N.Y.S.2d 722 (New York City Munic. Ct. 1951).
19. Moore v. Harter, 67 Ohio St. 250, 65 N.E. 883 (1902). It would seem more correct
to say that the tenant holds over on the landlord's terms rather than as a trespasser because
the landlord has elected to hold him as a tenant. See also text with note 3 supra.
20. E.g., Meaher v. Pomeroy, 49 Ala. 146 (1873); Moll v. Main Motor Co., 213 Ark.
28, 210 S.W.2d 321 (1948); Colyear v. Tobriner, 7 Cal. 2d 735, 62 P.2d 741 (1936);
Canning v. Fibush, 77 Cal. 196, 19 Pac. 376 (1888); Atkinson v. Cole, 16 Colo. 83, 26
Pac. 815 (1891); Lasher v. Heist, 126 Ill. App. 82 (1906); Galloway v. Kerby, 9 Ill. App.
501 (1881); Rodriguez v. Combes, 2 La. 275 (1819); Iorio v. Donnelly, 178 N.E.2d 28
(Mass. 1961); Abrams v. Sherwin, 269 Pa. 31, 112 Ad. 235 (1920); Pfingstl v. Chenot,
165 Pa. Super. 222, 67 A.2d 649 (1949).
21. Lane v. Greene, 21 Ohio App. 62, 152 N.E. 790 (1926). In Meaher v. Pomeroy,
49 Ala. 146 (1873) and Lasher v. Heist, 126 Ill. App. 82 (1906), the courts denied recovery
on the principle that the law never implies a promise against the express declaration of
a party sought to be charged.
In Galloway v. Kerby, 9 Ill. App. 501, 504 (1881), the court explained: "Such a right of
recovery could, under the circumstances, arise only upon privity of contract; and mutual
assent is the fundamental principle of all contracts."
In the first reported American case deciding the issue, the court denied liability on the
grounds that no action for rent could be maintained where no contract existed between the
parties. Rodriguez v. Combes, 2 La. 275 (1819).
The language varies only slightly. In Welk v. Bidwell, 136 Conn. 603, 606, 73 A.2d
295, 297 (1950):
The crux of the matter lies in the fact that a lease is a contract. . . .Where there
has been no meeting of the minds there is no contract. If a landlord insists
on one rate of rental and the tenant insists on another, there is no meeting of the
minds.
22. Meaher v. Pomeroy, 49 Ala. 146 (1873); Moll v. Main Motor Co., 213 Ark. 28,
210 S.W.2d 321 (1948); Cowell v. Snyder, 15 Cal. App. 634, 115 Pac. 961 (1911);
Atkinson v. Cole, 16 Colo. 83, 26 Pac. 815 (1891); Welk v. Bidwell, 136 Conn. 603, 73
A.2d 295 (1950); Galloway v. Kerby, 9 Ill. App. 501 (1881).
23. Meaher v. Pomeroy, supra note 22; Welk v. Bidwell, supra note 22; Galloway v.
Kerby, supra note 22. See also 52 C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant § 506 (1947).
24. Abrams v. Sherwin, 269 Pa. 31, 112 Atl. 235 (1920); Pfingstl v. Chenot, 165 Pa.
Super. 222, 67 A.2d 649 (1949).
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sum equal to the previous rent25 will suffice to constitute a protest. In
general, any reaction by the tenant beyond silence should be sufficient to
destroy the element of assent necessary to the tenant's liability.
The cases which have refused to hold the tenant liable over his
expressed objections to the landlord's demand nevertheless disagree
as to the measure of damages for holding over. The majority of decisions
seem to favor.damages equal to the reasonable rental value of the prop-
erty,2" while other courts have assessed liability in terms of the rent
stipulated in the expired lease. 7 A variant of the rental value standard
imposes liability for the reasonable rental value of the premises provided
that this sum is no greater than the stipulated rent of the former term.28
It would seem that consistency of principle would be better served if
damages were assessed at the rental stipulated in the previous lease,
inasmuch as the tenant's refusal to assent to the new terms raises the
implication in law that the holdover is subject to the terms of the previous
lease.29 Moreover, the reasonable rental value is more appropriately the
standard of damages as against the trespasser.30 If the landlord must elect
to hold the defendant as either a tenant or a wrongdoer, and if the court
has found that a contractual relationship of landlord and tenant does
not exist, then by bringing suit for rent, the landlord should not be
allowed to recover on a different theory in the same action.
FLORIDA FORECAST: THE OBJECTING TENANT
In the instant case the landlord did not notify the tenant until after
their lease had expired that a higher rent would be demanded in the
future. It is submitted, however, that the principles of law set out above
are of equal application in such a situation. The principle that a tenant
who holds over is, in the absence of a modifying agreement, subject to
25. Canning v. Fibush, 77 Cal. 196, 19 Pac. 376 (1888); Lasher v. Heist, 126 Ill. App.
82 (1906).
26. The courts have assessed damages equal to the reasonable rental value of the
premises on the theory that the defendant, by objecting to the landlord's proposal, becomes
a tenant at sufferance or a trespasser. Colyear v. Tobriner, 7 Cal. 2d 735, 62 P.2d 741
(1936); Cowell v. Snyder, 15 Cal. App. 634, 115 Pac. 961 (1911); Welk v. Bidwell, 136
Conn. 603, 73 A.2d 295 (1950); Holmes v. Freeman, 23 Conn. Supp. 504, 185 A.2d 88
(1963); Rodriguez v. Combes, 2 La. 275 (1819); Iorio v. Donnelly, 178 N.E.2d 28 (Mass.
1961).
In Abrams v. Sherwin, 269 Pa. 31, 112 Atl. 235 (1920), the tenant was held not
liable for the rent demanded, but the court decided that by holding over he consented
to pay a reasonable and compensatory rate.
27. Lasher v. Heist, 126 Ill. App. 82 (1906); De Young v. Buchanan, 23 Md. (10 Gill
& J) 101 (1838); Pfingstl v. Chenot, 165 Pa. Super. 222, 67 A.2d 649 (1949).
28. Atkinson v. Cole, 16 Colo. 83, 26 Pac. 815 (1891).
29. See text with note 7 supra.
30. Greenberg v. Koppelow, 76 Cal. App. 2d 631, 173 P.2d 821 (1946); Seligson v.
Klyman, 227 N.C. 347, 42 S.E.2d 220 (1947). For a discussion of the liability of a hold-




the terms of the previous tenancy, would seem to be unaffected by the
time at which the tenancy is modified by agreement. Although Florida
has abrogated by statute31 the common-law rule that holding over gives
rise to a tenancy for the same term as the previous lease, this does not
negate the existence of a new tenancy which arises by implication of law
and which may be modified by contract.
Inasmuch as the instant case decided only the liability of the hold-
over tenant who remains silent with respect to a notice that the previous
rent will be increased, the Florida courts may have to decide whether
their rule should be different in the case of the tenant who excepts to
the landlord's demand. Although permitting recovery would seem to
violate the principles of contract law by which the instant case was
decided, there is much to be said for a rule which allows the property
owner to establish the conditions by which another may use his property.
If the tenant refuses to pay what the landlord asks, he may vacate the
premises and seek a new location, or he may negotiate with the landlord
for a different rental more to his liking. The courts, by holding that the
tenant may stay on at the same rental as stipulated in the expired lease,
.make it possible for the tenant to stay on the premises while he shops
around for another location at a better rent. In effect, this amounts to a
judicial mandate extending the previous lease beyond the term mutually
agreed upon by the parties, and moreover fails to give effect to a super-
seding contract created by an acceptance conforming to the manner pro-
vided for in the landlord's offer-i.e., by the tenant's holding over. The
severity of such a rule to the tenant could be minimized by allowing him
to hold over at the former rental when his continued occupation is due
to a bona fide dispute, or when the landlord's demand was prompted
by knowledge that the tenant would be unable to vacate the premises on
time.
DONALD M. KLEIN
INCOME TAX-DEDUCTIBILITY OF LEGAL FEES INCURRED
DEFENDING INCOME PRODUCING PROPERTY
IN A DIVORCE ACTION
When a California wife sued for divorce, her husband filed a cross-
claim and won a complete victory. He, not the wife, was granted the
divorce and her extensive property claims were completely denied.' The
31. FLA. STAT. § 83.04 (1961). This section provides that the tenancy which results
shall be a tenancy at sufferance unless the landlord consents to the tenants' continued
occupation, in which case a tenancy at will results.
1. The wife alleged that the earnings accumulated and retained by her husband's
three controlled corporations were the product of his personal services, not the result of an
accretion in capital values. Therefore she contended that his stockholdings in the enter-
